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RECENT BOOKS
CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE. By Morris L. Ernst
and Alan U. Schwartz. New York: Macmillan. 1964. Pp. xvi, 288. $6.

Anxious to make legal thinking "intelligible to the laity," two
seasoned and knowledgeable practitioners have here undertaken to
survey for non-lawyers what they call the Law of the Obscene. Why
they should have selected this area to exemplify jurisprudential
wisdom is puzzling, for whatever the Law of the Obscene is conceived to be, it hardly marks a moment of triumph for legal method.
The common law of obscenity still awaits its Mansfield. Apart from
a few memorable apothegms of Learned Hand, Curtis Bok, Jerome
Frank, and a bare handful more, most censorship decisions are as
dismal as the materials with which they deal.
Apparently spawned from Charles Sedley's indecent exposure
case in the reign of Charles II, obscenity law was in thrall for more
than a century to Lord Justice Cockburn's omnivorous phrase in
Regina v. Hicklin-"whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influence and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall." 1 The fragile contingencies, the headlong assumptions, the imprecision and subjectivity of this formulation were
scarcely remarked as court after court found it serviceable weaponry
for suppressing whatever was disapproved. Even during this century
the decisions usually quibbled with details rather than the premises
of the Hicklin rule. Only in the last decade have we been driven to
search for the obscene among that which both attracts because it
"appeals to the prurient interest" and repels because it is "patently
offensive."
It is apparent that few things so unsettle the judicial mind as
the human reproductive system. In an obscenity prosecution, the
judicial process seems to take on a peculiar sacerdotal quality.
Though he may be the Rabelaisian wit of the bar convention, the
judge who mounts the bench and confronts a photograph of a nude
feels compelled to put a stop to unwed motherhood, juvenile crime,
lavatory art, the sins of onanism, lowered church attendance, and a
welter of similar problems. As a result, obscenity decisions have been
marked by more than their fair share of ostrich gymnastics, bootstrap ascents, tautologous pieties, and plain cant. It would seem
better, as a mere matter of professional pride, to hide all this as a
trade secret rather than to expose it to a heathen multitude. Messrs.
Ernst and Schwartz, however, are nothing daunted.
That the story is fascinating is undeniable. The authors have
1. P. 35.
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here retold pithily and with dash the tribulations of such official
martyrs to suppression as Mademoiselle de Maupin, Ulysses, Lady
Chatterley, and Fanny Hill. The authors recall the battles over the
Well of Loneliness, The Sex Side of Life, Married Love, and many
more. They rehearse the United States Supreme Court decisions
from Doubleday to Butler, through Roth to the last Bantam Books
case, in sufficient detail to give even the most unsophisticated reader
an understanding of how the Constitution got into the dirty book
business. While some favorite cases are omitted and others barely
mentioned, this is a representative, readable, and illuminating selection. The book variously excerpts judicial utterances, editorializes
about clusters of decisions, paraphrases or quotes other commentators, and even exhibits in full the throes of the Maryland Supreme
Court in deciding how hard "hard core pornography" must be.
In a kaleidoscopic survey of what the cases hold, the authors
cannot pause for long over the hard questions. Do we suppress a
book because an unfl.ustered judge can really competently predict
that it will fluster someone else, or is this only another decorous
"fable agreed upon"? Consistent with freedom of expression and
individual liberties, does contemporary society really have a right to
preserve us from copulatory incitements, whether pictures or perfumes? Is there a meaningful link between revery, however lush or
lurid, and overt conduct which can rationally be regarded as antisocial? How many undeniable outrages in our society do we obscure
by seizing upon the smut-peddler as public scapegoat? What are the
individual and social uses of the unrepressed sexual imagination as
well as its dangers? Neither this book nor the decisions it reviews
provide many helpful answers.
The question whether a writing is obscene, a New York jurist
of a generation ago is quoted as declaring, "is one of the plainest
that can be presented to a jury, and under the guidance of a discreet
judge there is little danger of their reaching a wrong decision."2
The recent varied fortunes of Tropic of Cancer in many jurisdictions purporting to apply the same rule of federal constitutional
law suggest that the problem has never been so simple. Indeed, the
Supreme Court, since Roth, has been having a harder time explaining the results it plainly wishes to reach. And even when the Justices
are in agreement, experience suggests that it takes a good deal more
than their opinion to restrict the self-assured excesses of the lower
courts. In the last decade, as the Court has sought to curb the
censor's zeal, trial judges have often penalized transgressions of the
national moral law of obscenity with a voracity which might have
made Torquemada blush. With few exceptions in recent years, the
2. Andrews,

J.,

in People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 412 (App. Div. 1884).
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appellate chore in censorship cases is to disinfect what trial judges
close to "community morality" persist in doing.
Though there are warnings to the contrary in this volume, its
very design tends to suggest that the law of obscenity has shown
a long, steady march upward and onward, with true principles gradually honed, refined, and made more rational with each succeeding
decision. Unfortunately, it isn't so. Having rejected in 1957 the thesis
that disturbing thoughts about sex should be measured by basically
the same standards as are used to measure disturbing thoughts about
sedition or riots, the Supreme Court is still struggling to discover
acceptable criteria of the obscene and to apply them to various
media and diverse circumstances. Other courts are following behind
at varying paces. Even if this volume makes the Law of Obscenity
intelligible to laymen, it is likely to take years (and more volumes)
to make it intelligible to lawyers.
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